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The Mind in Early Buddhism Bhikkhu Thich Minh Thanh New Delhi, 2001 |
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INTRODUCTION
PALI-ENGLISH DICTIONARY gives the following 3
basic meanings to the term 'citta': The first citta (v):
to shine, to be bright, variegated, manifold, beautiful; tasty, sweet,
spiced (of cakes); (nt) painting. The second citta (nt) [Skt:
citta, orig. p.p. of cinteti]: 'heart'. 'Mind', however,
gets pretty much frequency in actual use as rendering. And, the third
citta (n): name of the first month Chaitra. In the whole dissertation,
both the first and the second cittas will be intact; we shall
work on the remaining second citta only.
Though it is not totally safe in respect of
preciseness in all contexts where the term 'citta' occurs
throughout the Pāli literature, the term is usually rendered as
'mind' by the majority of the authoritative translators of Pāli.
'Heart' is less used as rendering. But if we consents that citta
in singular form should be rendered as 'heart' and when in plural, as
'thought' which is closed to mind in meaning, then in the Pāli
literature citta nearly always occurs in the singular (=heart),
and out of 150 cases in the Nikāyas only 3 times in the plural
(=thought). This primary notion is impressive of the fact that the
concept of citta seems quite complicated and confusing that a
rigidly distinctive attitude will find it frustrate. For our basic knowledge there should be a view to
the dictionary meanings of 'mind'
[1].
'Mind' has 14 meanings that fall under the three headings: (A)
memory; (B) Thought, purpose, intention; and, (C) Mental or
psychic faculty. Skipping over the first heading that is simply
confined within the realm of memory we come to the second one. This
one is the richest and covers 6 groups of meanings: (1a) The action or
state of thinking about something; the thought chiefly in have mind
of, think of, give heed to. (1b) Attention, heed. (2a) Purpose,
intention. (2b) An inclination, a wish; a liking. (3) The direction of
a person's thoughts, desires, inclinations, or energies. (4) A
person's opinion, judgement, or view. (5a) A disposition, character,
or way of thinking and feeling. (5b) A particular feeling or attitude
towards something. (6) The state of a person's thoughts and feelings. The third heading (C) concerns the psychological
aspect covering the following three groups of meaning: (1a) The seat
of awareness, thought, volition, and feeling; cognitive and emotional
phenomena and powers as constructing a controlling system, special as
opposed to matter, the spiritual as distinguished from the bodily part
of a human being. (1b) A person or a group of people collectively as
the embodiment of mental faculties. (1c) A controlling or directing
spiritual being or agency; (2) Special the intellect, intellectual
powers, esp. as distinguished from the will and emotions. (3) The
healthy or normal condition of the mental faculties. The ideas about the mind as above mentioned,
although quite general, are still helpful somehow in the first
inquiry. At the risk of jumping the gun we can say that the 5.a
'disposition, character, or way of thinking and feeling' has much to
do with the Buddhist concept of citta under question,
whereas, the 1.a. 'the seat of awareness, thought, volition, and
feeling' is the most controversial and subtle issue, say, in Buddhist
system. Whether there is something as a seat (a place in which
administrative power or the like is centered) that sways over the
mental and emotional function of a being brings in
much more speculation than settlement because
of the fact that any ordinary reasoning whatever is prone to build up
a soul or an ego which is so metaphysical and speculative in
character. 1. The Evolutionary
Citta We should be aware that citta in the
Buddhist Pāli texts is used not thoroughly in the same set of
meanings. It shares the same process of almost all lexicon
units, say, getting the primitive meaning from the pre-Buddhist
conception, adopting new shade of meanings in the traditional Buddhist
contexts, undergoing modification, transformation and transmutation,
developing current shades of meaning. The process was going parallel
with the evolutionary divergence of Buddhist
thoughts through ages and characterized by the conceptions of
different schools of Buddhist philosophy among
them the most noticeable ones are Theravāda, Sarvāstivāda,
Sautrāntika, Yogācāra, Mādhyamika, and Tantrism. In other
words, 'the term is common to all schools of Buddhism and is attested
in a wide variety of meanings varying according to textual contexts
and respective philosophic tradition'[2].
But our research work is done on the basis of the Pāli Tipiṭaka
only, avoiding any sectarian bias and alien conglomeration. 2. Synonymous
Equivalents of Citta It should be noted here that citta (verb:
cit) and cetas (verb: cet) are almost identical
in meaning and application. In promiscuous application there is no
cogent evidence of a clear separation of their respective fields of
meaning; a few instances indicate the role of cetas as seat of
citta, whereas most of them show no distinction. There are
compounds having both citta- and ceto- in identical
meanings, for example, citta-samādhi and ceto-samādhi.
Other compounds show a preference for either one or the other, as
ceto is preferred in ceto-khila and ceto-vimutti
(but vimutta-citta), whereas citta is restricted to
combination with upakkilesa, etc. Let us single out some
sentences for illustration: Vivaṭna
cetsā sappabhāsaṃ cittaṃ
bhāveti 'with open heart he contemplates a radiant thought'[3];
cetasā cittaṃ samannesati
vippamuttaṃ 'with his
heart he scrutinizes their pure mind'[4].
Cetaso tato cittaṃ nivāraye
'a desire of his heart he shall exclude from this'[5].
It is interesting to note here that the dual
mental projection as in other systems also appears clearly in
Buddhism. The notion of one's self and another self dramatizing, so to
speak, among the flow of individual subjective experience. We shall
come back to this matter in the fifth chapter about essential aspects
of citta. And this projection is at times expressed by citta
and the closely allied term cetos, as if we should speak of
mind affecting will, or 'heart' influencing 'head': Ye should
restrain, curb, subdue, citta by ceto[6].
Another passage in the Saṁyutta
Nikāya says that we roam in all directions with ceto; here
ceto is used instead of citta[7].
The passage probably refers to our ability to dream about and think of
distant places and events. As occurring in the Sutta Piṭaka
the three terms, citta, viññāṇa
and mana are usually interchangeable;
all denote function of mentation. Despite of their interchangeability
and same denotation we still, however, can notice with a little
arbitrariness that they tend toward three distinct aspects of its,
say, subjective, sensory and perceptive, and intellectual aspects. That mana 'is said to represent the
rational faculty of man'[8],
thus being designated to the intellectuality confronts the
disagreement by the Dhammapada[9]
where it also denotes the idea of subjective chiefship and directing.
Viññāṇa with a more
clear-cut connotation 'represents the field of sense and
sense-reaction, that is the sphere of sensory and perceptive activity'[10].
Citta is supposed to keep as general as ever, though, this does
not exclude its tending toward subjectivity. 3. Semantical and Functional Aspects of Citta PALI-ENGLISH DICTIONARY makes the conviction that
the meaning of citta is best understood when explaining it by
expressions familiar to us, as: with all my heart; heart and soul;
I have no heart to do it; blessed are the pure in heart; singleness of
heart; all of which emphasize the emotional and conative side or
'thought' more than its mental and rational side. With the minute
explanatory notes being omitted the meaning of citta as given
in PALI-ENGLISH DICTIONARY can be presented as the heart usually in
psychological sense, and further explained as the center and focus of
man's emotional nature as well as that intellectual element which
inheres in and accompanies its manifestations[11].
Emotional, conative, and rational or mental as the three sides in the
meaning of citta is further elaborated in detail and with
illustrations by ENCYCLOPAEDIA OF BUDDHISM[12]. The term citta as our main concern should
basically refer, on account of its general usage in the Pāli
Nikāyas, to the nexus of one's emotional nature and, in its
dynamic aspect, to the locus or the function of thought. That "Citta represents the subjective
aspect of consciousness"[13]
will be correct in many a case, however, does not assure itself in all
contexts. The first verse of the Dhammapada that reads, "Mind (mana)
is the forerunner of (all evil) states. Mind is chief; mind-made are
they. If one speaks or acts with wicked mind, because of that,
suffering follows one, even as the wheel follows the hoof of the
draught-ox."[14]
has obviously disagreed on it, assigning the subjectiveness not to
citta but to mana. Buddhaghosa
the later commentator of Pāli literature establishes four
meanings for citta: (1) it is citta that thinks of its
objects on account that it arranges itself in a series by way of
apperception in a thought process; (2) citta, on the other
hand, refers to the resultant thoughts which are accumulated by its
intentional actions, wholesome and/or unwholesome, that is, it reaps
what it sows; in this meaning it is regarded as the store-house
holding mental seeds in the forms of mental dispositions,
proclivities, tendencies, and latent forces; (3) citta denotes
all mental activities, so all classes of thoughts are called citta
and arrange themselves according to the context of mentation; and (4)
the meaning of citta can be conceived also by virtue of its
capacity to create a variety of effects[15].
Unfortunately, he did not give any clue for the simple flux in his
account of citta. If any, hardly is 'it arranges itself in a
series by way of apperception in a thought process' suggestive of the
flux. In terms of Buddhist psychoanalysis the three
different aspects of activities that citta performs are
effective aspect (vedanā), cognitive aspect (saññā) (of
or pertaining to the mental processes of perception, memory, judgment,
and reasoning, as contrasted with emotional and volitional processes)
and conative aspect (cetanā) (mental actions having to do with
striving, including desire, volition, and purpose). The effective
aspect and the cognitive aspect are mental states dependent on
citta[16].
ENCYCLOPAEDIA OF BUDDHISM says that the cetanā clearly is the
causative form of citta (cinteti >ceteti, cetayati >cetanā) and
that the effective aspect (vedanā) refers to the feeling tone
of citta; the cognitive aspect (saññā) is concerned with
knowing, believing, reasoning and perceiving; and the conative aspect
(cetanā) is concerned with acting, willing, striving, and
desiring. These three aspects do not of course function separately. As
mental processes all three aspects operate all at once by way of
concurrent action and inter-action. Cognition is associated with
conation that in turn is bound up invariably with the hedonic quality
of feeling[17].
4. Odd Idea about Citta It is interesting to notice the alien
idea about citta that happened to be in the proposition: 'citta
is incorporeal and resident in the cave of the heart'[18].
It is probably because of a reference to this verse, in respect of the
physical basis of citta, that some section of the
Theravādins developed a cardio-centric theory according to which
the heart (hadayavatthu) is the locus of mind and mental
consciousness. These Theravādins appear to be alone in holding
this theory and this is confirmed by the statement of Yaśomitra[19]
that it is confined only to the school of Sri Lankan Buddhism.
It is hard to find in the orthodox system of Buddhist thought any
place to which the idea can be incorporated properly. 5. Reliable Base for our Definitive Understanding The traditional Buddhism denies
any kinds of substantial definition of citta to the extreme. 'Buddha,' ENCYCLOPAEDIA OF BUDDHISM says, 'is the
first psychologist to 'psychologise' without a soul and the teaching
on citta is squarely based on the doctrine of the
non-substantiality of all phenomena'[20].
The encyclopedia warns anyone who insists on the clear-cut definition
of citta that 'the complexity of its usage has sometimes defied
all attempts of modern scholarship at determining the specificity of
its signification'[21].
The Buddha seems to adopt a functional view of concepts, utilizing the
term saṅkhā to refer to
concepts; and the functional use is often expressed by the verbal
expression: saṅkhaṃ
gacchati or 'conceive'. The following passage is typical: "Citta,
just as from cow comes milk, and from milk curds, and from curd
butter, and from butter ghee, and from ghee to junket; yet, when there
is milk, there is no conceiving as 'curd' or 'butter' or 'ghee' or
'junket'; instead on that occasion there is conceiving as 'milk'"[22].
It can be further noted that citta may be
rendered by intention, impulse, design; mood, disposition, state of
mind, reaction to impressions. Citta, however, sometimes
stands merely for an idea or a thought, for example, a person who was
born professional soldier must previously have had the following
thought or idea in the common sense: 'Let those beings be tortured,
bound, destroyed, exterminated'[23].
The citta can be quitted up as is expressed in the passage,
'incompetent, Sunakkhatta, is the naked ascetic, Patika's
son, to meet me face to face, if he withdraw not those words, if he
put not away that idea (citta), if he renounce not that
opinion. If he thinks that, holding to those words, to that idea,
maintaining that opinion, he would come to meet the Samaṇa
Gotama, his head would split asunder'[24].
Citta here means merely an idea.
6. The Preferred
Functionalism It is suggestible that citta can be
analyzed as to its nature in the disciplines of psychology, ethics and
naturalism[25].
But for the sake of being in concord with the Buddhist theory of
suffering and of non-substance - the former mainly relating to the
basic for ethical attitude and the latter, for philosophical viewpoint
- the disciplines of ethics and of psychology are preferable. The
functionalistic approach in the discipline of modern psychology, it is
at the risk going a little astray to note, comes to overshadow the
once-dominating structuralism, emphasizing "the study of mind from the
'is for' point of view rather than from the 'is' point of view"[26].
The Abhidhamma texts reveal the
comprehensive system of the universe as consists in four great
divisions: citta, cetasika, rūpa and nibbāna. Citta
holds the top position and can be predicated in three ways, namely,
'predication by agency (kattu-sādhana), predication by
instrumentality (karaṇa-sādhana)
and predication by simple flux' (bhāva-sādhana); the last one
is considered to be nearest to the truth. It is in keeping with the
essence of Buddhist non-substance theory to say, 'yielding true
knowledge is the predication by simple flux'[27].
Citta is overwhelmingly characterized by combination so that its manifestation should be worded in terms of relationship. If we chanced upon the definition of any wholesome or unwholesome citta in the Dhammasaṅgaṇi or the Vibhaṅga, we would be aware that to define any citta is but to touch all mental functions, mental agents of an individual. For the sake of illustration we quote, though it is at risk of being clumsy, here the whole definition of the first of the eight main types of citta relating to the Sensuous Universe: "When a good thought concerning the sensuous universe has arisen, which is accompanied by happiness and associated with knowledge, and has as its object a sight, a sound, a smell, a (mental) state, or what not, then there is contact, feeling, perception, thinking, thought, conception, discursive thought, joy, easy, self-collectedness, the faculty of faith, the faculty of energy, the faculty of mindfulness, the faculty of concentration, the faculty of wisdom, the faculty of ideation, the faculty of happiness, the faculty of vitality; right views, right intention, right endeavour, right mindfulness, right concentration; the power of faith, the power of energy, the power of mindfulness, the power of concentration, the power of wisdom, the power of conscientiousness, the power of the fear of blame; absence of lust, absence of hate, absence of dulness, absence of covetousness, absence of malice, right views; conscientiousness, fear of blame; serenity in the sense and thought, lightness in sense and thought, plasticity in sense and thought, facility in sense and thought, fitness in sense and thought, directness in sense and thought; mindfulness, intelligence, quiet, insight, grasp, balance. Now, these -- or whatever other incorporeal, causually induced states there are on that occasion -- these are states that are good"[28] All the functions and the so-called agents are
but transect and ever-changing like a stream of water[29]. 7. Nature of Citta The nature of citta is difficult to be
seen and understood and it is very subtle[30],
very hard to control, assuredly light and quick and attaching itself
to whatever it craves[31].
It is, in case of the worldling, constantly frightened, terrified and
alarmed as well as agitated, flurried and anxious[32].
The nature of citta should also be counted on account of its
dependent origination in which the causal factors play the decisive
role in the arising of mind, thus subjecting to the impermanence
earmark of saṅkhāra.
Even in the Buddha's time Bhikkhu Sāti was ignored of the fact
that there is no arising of the mind (in this case the term Viññāṇa
is employed) unless it is through the collocation of causal factors[33].
The nature of citta is multifaceted, this
suggests the title of the fourth chapter, and the expositions
situationally given by the Buddha about its nature are hardly molded
into any formal definition of citta. Even the Buddha felt
difficult in describing a single aspect of its nature, saying, "I
consider, monks, that there is no phenomenon that comes and goes so
quickly as mind. It is not easy to find simile to show how quickly
mind comes and goes"[34]. Citta in the Buddhist view, is thus a
series of events in an incessant process of mentation. Citta as
unitary term is nothing more than a convenient collective noun to
comprehend a wide and complex nexus of mental states in flux as ever
mentioned in the forgoing section. As to its nature the citta
or mind of the worldly individual is, psychologically speaking,
constantly throbbing, trembling and wavering[35].
Ethically, it is exceedingly difficult to be protected and to be saved
from falling into moral lapse. Naturalistically, it quivers like a
fish out of water distracted by a multiplicity of stimuli[36].
Now, the main course of treatment should be
postponed to make a brief introduction of the pre-Buddhist concept of
citta. And then, it is followed by a survey of the primary
source on the basis of which the study is elaborated. This survey
tents towards chronological perspective. B. PRE-BUDDHIST
CITTA 1. Citta of General
Meanings Among the most important verbal roots
denoting mental processes in the Ṛg
Veda, N. Ross Reat observes, √cit
is the most general in meaning that it well-nigh refers to the
functioning of any mental organs and faculties. The most common nouns
derived from this verbal root, namely, citta, citti and
cetas, are for all intents and purposes synonymous, and refer
very generally to "thought" or in some cases "mind". Nouns and verbs
derived from the root √cit are so broad in meaning as to be
capable of being substituted for virtually any of the more precise
terms for mental organs and faculties. The verbal root √man and
its derivatives - the closest relatives of √cit - are almost
as broad in meaning as the derivatives of √cit. Generally
speaking, they imply more specifically than √cit the process
of intellectual cogitation. Other than this very vague and
inconsistent distinction, the derivatives of √cit and √man, in the
Ṛg Veda, are practically indistinguishable in meaning. Verbal
forms of √cit, however, are more common than nominal forms
while the opposite is true of derivatives of √man. It is
probably best therefore to translate nominal forms of √cit with "thought",
and the term manas with "mind". Such translation construe
manas as mental organ and citta as mental faculties, even
though admittedly there is no clear distinction between these terms in
actual usage in the Ṛg Veda[37]. The derivatives of √cit in
Ṛg Veda, like the term citta in Buddhism, refer in the
broadest way to mental process whether perceptive, intellectual,
emotional or imaginative[38].
It may be said that these derivatives denote the functioning of any
one of the several mental organs and faculties mentioned in the
Ṛg Veda. Used with the term manas, √cit indicates mental
perception or intellectual thought. With hṛd (heart) it refers
to emotional or intuitive thought. With √dhī it refers to
imaginative, visionary thought. With kratu it refers to
volitional thought. It is the broad and general nature of √cit and its
derivatives that constitutes the most distinctive characteristic of
this family of terms[39]. It should be noted that most of the
psychologically significant derivatives of √cit occur in
relatively late texts, the majority being in the Maitrī Upaniṣad[40]. 2. Citta and Mana The two terms are so close in interrelation that
most of the cases especially in the early Vedic texts they are
interchangeable without any risk of unintentional modification of the
meaning. In the Vedas, the idioms referring to mind are nearly
always manas; they are much like our own analogous phrases such
as: "Sun travels quick as mind"... "we know what thy mind was"...
"approving thy mind"... "this praise has been offered by the mind"...
"what a man reaches with mind, that he expresses by speech"... "by
what great mind may we arrest the storm gods?"... "wise in mind...
trembling in mind... please in mind"... "a woman mindful of the
gods"... "we must consult the thought (citta) of another...
beyond our thoughts (cittāni)"... "which prayer is to be the
choice of thy mind?"[41].
A comparison of the frequency of the main psychological terms used in
the 13 'principal', i.e. Early and Middle Upaniṣads results in the following table[42]. Table
1:
For a further distinction between the two terms
we can note that in most contexts the terms derived from √cit is associated
with manas (mind). The manas is often depicted as the
agent of the process of thought as represented by the derivatives of
√cit, as in the
phrases such as manasā cekitānam (thinking or perceiving with
the mind), mano cetati (the mind thinks). In other contexts, a
derivative of √cit may qualify
the mind in an adjective sense, as in the phrase cikitvin-manas
(thoughtful or perceptive mind)[44].
The above distinctive cases at most are not enough to refute the
predominance of their basic interchangeability as presented in the
previous section. 3. Emotional and
Intellectual Citta N. Ross Reat observes that the emotional
connotation of √cit is
most evident when derivatives based on it are said to be moved by an
external force, as when the worship and/or sacrifice stirs the thought
(cetana). On the other hand, these derivatives are also said to
be the stirring or moving force which incites various gods to action,
as when Soma and Agni are said to be moved or stirred
into action by the thought of the sacrificer. Emotional content is
also found in passages such as one where Atri is said to "think with a
friendly mind"[45]. Citta seems to have much to do with the
basic sensual consciousness, as in the following verse, where the
departure of citta marks the end of such consciousness: "When a
sick person about to die gets to such weakness as to fall into a
stupor they say of him, his thought (citta) has departed, he
does not hear, he does not see, he does not speak with speech, he does
not think"[46].
But in the another aspect, the derivatives of √cit are of
intellectuality. The derivatives denote in several compounds some sort
of development or excellence of the faculty of thought or perception,
as in the terms: vipaścita (wise or insightful), sucetas
(thoughtful), gambīira-cetas (deep-thoughted), praceta
(wise). The intellectual connotation is obviously predominant in the
phrase "to solve (āciketam) a riddle"[47]. 4. Citta of Vision. It is observed that the derivatives of √cit associated with
the potence of seeing, in the broad sense of the word, are in some
cases quite literal, as when Agni is said to be observant (cetiṣṭham)
with the eyes (akṣabhir),
or in a wartime curse in which the wish is expressed that the
perception (citta) of those foes who stand watch be destroyed.
In other contexts, the term citta seems to mean simply
"visible", as in the phrase citta-garbha,
which Griffith translates "visibly pregnant". In still other cases,
derivatives of √cit refer to mental perception, as when it is said that
Mitra and Varuṇa
perceive (cikyatuḥ)
even with their eyes closed, or where it is said with relation to a
riddle that those who have eyes, obviously mental eyes, can see while
the blind do not perceive (na vicetad andhaḥ),
or again where it is asked, "who discerns (ciketa) the workings
of Mitra and Varuṇa?". The derivatives of √cit
are also used to denote vision, particularly mental vision in the
Ṛg Veda[48]. When purified, citta is praised as
prajñā of the early Upaniṣads.
In the sixth book of the Maitri, we can find both cetas
and citta exalted to mean nothing less than the prajñā[49].
A purified citta is said to be capable of grasping the ultimate
truth, however, its purification seems to involve its cessation[50]. 5. Metaphysical Citta The substantialist metaphysic of Indian thought
could be expressed by the presumptive statements such as the Upaniṣadic
passage which reads that in the beginning, this world was only the
self (ātman) in the form of a person. Looking around he saw
nothing else than the self. He first said 'I am'. There arose then the
name of 'I' for the first time. Later on he realized the real self and
the mutable self (or the empirical consciousness) which are
graphically presented with the image of two birds perched on one
branch, the one simply watching and the other enjoying the fruit[51].
Through the range of meaning as meant by the root √cit above
presented, it is quite safe to suppose that the root √cit 's family would
be able to compass either of 'the two birds' and both of them. The derivatives of √cit seem to be
construed either as the essence of the soul and universe or as the
fundamental characteristic of both the individual and the universal
soul. It is implied in the rhetoric question: "This body is like a
cart, without thought; by the power of what super-sensuous being is it
made to arise with thought (cetanavat); or who is its mover?"
or the statement "The enjoyer (bhoktṛ)
of this universe is without qualities (nirguṇa),
but because of its being an enjoyer, it must have thought (caitanya)[52].
As a super-sensuous being, the thought has the potence of creating.
This creativity is not confined to artistic composition, as when it is
said that the hymn springs from the thoughtful mind (cikitvin-manas).
It may also refer to the idea of spontaneous creation of an entity, as
in a hymn stating that the gods created fire with citti. There
is another context where the Ṛbhus
are said to have created a miraculous chariot by means of "excellent
thought" (sucetas) and mind (manas)[53].
In fine, the Upaniṣadic
system virtually tends to regard the world as a creation of
consciousness, saying that at the dissolution of all, he alone remains
awake. Thus from that space, he awake this world which consists of
thought only (cetāmātra)[54].
C.
CHRONOLOGY IN THE BUDDHIST CANON 1.
Different Tables
of Stratification Exploration into the conclusive outcomes of the stratification of the Buddhist canonical texts proposed by the leading scholars conversant in the Pāli literature let us know that the oldest stratification may be that of T. W. Rhys Davids who observes ten strata scheme. Unfortunately, it is not an easy feeling on the side of those who care for scientific exactness to find that both B. C. Law and K. L. Hazra do summarize the same scheme from Buddhist India by T. W. Rhys Davids but do not turn out the same summaries. (see appendix 1) The chronology observed by T. W. Rhys Davids,
nevertheless, is not fully agreed on by other scholars. B. C. Law
regards it as too catechetical, too cut and dried, and too general to
be accepted, though its suggestion is a good guide to the
determination of the chronology of the Pāli canonical texts[55].
We will be in touch with the table time after time when dealing with
each individual collection and their component texts. B. C. Law gives his own scheme of 5 layers,
basing on the dates of 6 Buddhist Councils in India and Ceylon
respectively[56]: Table
2:
B. C. Law gets a full credit for the introduction
of the foregoing 5-stage setting which, unfortunately, is not further
elaborated on. And, another contribution is at the end of the chapter
where he reserves for the 'Chronology of the Pāli Canon' and
comes back to the scheme of 10 strata originally sketched out by T. W.
Rhys Davids, on which he makes some remarkable comments, modifications
and adjustments.
For the sake of comparison we should juxtapose
the previous stratification of T. W. Rhys Davids and the later one of
B. C. Law as follows, Table
3:
In his The Origin and Nature of Indian
Buddhism, K.T.S. Sarao shows a keen interest in the issue of
Buddhist chronology, giving an account on this concern with the
conclusion of 3 strata scheme tabulated as follows[59]: Table
4:
2. Chronology of the
Vinaya Piṭaka The Vinaya Piṭaka
known commonly as "Basket of Discipline" is the oldest and smallest of
the three sections of the Buddhist canonical Tipiṭaka
or "Triple Basket". It is that which regulates monastic life and the
daily affairs of monks and nuns according to rules attributed to the
Buddha. It varies less from school to school than does either the
Sutta (discourse of the Buddha and his disciples) or the
Abhidhamma (scholastic) sections of the canon, and the rules
themselves are basically the same even for Mahāyānas schools,
although some of the latter schools greatly extended the accompanying
narrative and commentarial material.
It is remarked that while the Sutta Piṭaka
is more doctrinally and cosmologically oriented, the focus of the
Vinaya Piṭaka is upon
proper courses of action conducive to making progress towards the
final spiritual attainment of nirvāṇa.
Although it is evident in early Indian Buddhism that categorical
distinctions were made between groups of bhikṣus
(referred to as bhāṇakas)
who had committed all or parts of these three collections to memory
for the purpose of preserving them through recitation, each "basket"
stands in complementary relationship to the other and the whole
represents an integrated system of religious teaching. Some scholars
and Buddhist apologists have understood the Vinaya to be the
first stage of the spiritual path, and extended code of behavioral
discipline elaborates from the basic principles of sīla (moral
ethical action)[60].
The Vinaya Piṭaka
texts show a certain resemblance with the Vedic Brāhmaṇas.
In both we find "rule" (vidhi) and "explanation of the meaning"
(arthavāda) by the side of one another, and the narrative poems
which stand out distinctly like oases in the desert of the religious
technics[61].
The term vinaya means putting away,
subduing, conversion, training, and discipline. R. C. Childers says
that Vinaya is regarded as the ecclesiastical code or common
law and it governs the Buddhist monks and it is mentioned in the
Vinaya Piṭaka. He states further that saṁvarav
and pahānav are two sorts of Vinaya or discipline and
they are discipline of restraint and discipline of getting rid of evil
states. He again describes Vinaya as "removal (of blame),
acquittal"[62].
Specially, Vinaya refers to the prescribed modes of conduct
incumbent upon Buddhist monks and nuns. The word is formed by
combining the prefix vi-, meaning "difference, distinction,
apart, away from", with the verb root √nī, meaning to lead. When combined they mean "to lead
away from".
Within the context of Buddhist monasticism,
Vinaya refers to the code of behavioral discipline that at once
delineates the life of the householder and that of the monk, and binds
the community of monks together into a common affective bond. In this
sense, Vinaya is that which separates or leads away from the
householder's way of life. It can also refer to the practice of mental
discipline that removes unhealthy states of mind from the monk's
disposition. In either sense of the term, Vinaya is regarded as
the effective expression or pragmatic implementation of the Buddha's
dharma (teaching). It is precept put into practice[63].
Historically, it is clear that Vinaya has
not only been the charter for the Buddhist monastic experience, but
has continued to function as a legitimizing device for reform within
the saṅgha as well. It
is important to note that just as the ancient laity play an important
role within the Sutta Vibhaṅga
literature by reporting infractions of discipline to the Buddha, so
has the laity in modern times continued to display great interest in
insuring that the saṅgha
adheres to the Vinaya. Lay concern for Vinaya,
however, is not expressed only for the purpose of keeping monks in
their proper places, but also out of the necessity of preserving a
saṅgha that truly function
as a spiritual refuge and a worthy object of meritorious action[64]. In the oldest record that we possess of the first
council, it is said that Mahākassapa asked Upāli about the two-fold
Vinaya. This suggests that he asked him only about the
Patimokkha rules for bhikkhus and bhikkhunis. In his
account of that council Buddhaghosa states that the theras
classified the Mahā Vibhaṅga,
the Bhikhuṇī Vibhaṅga,
the Khandhaka and the Parivāras, but he concedes that
the Vinaya Piṭaka as he
knew contained material which had not been recited at the first
council. It is obvious, and presumably Buddhashosa realised,
that the final two sections of the Khandhaka, which deal with
the first council and the second council dated 100 years later, could
not have been recited on that occasion, but there is no indication of
the portions of the Vinaya Piṭaka
he had in mind when he wrote of texts not being recited[65]. The Pāli Vinaya Piṭaka in the latest form is divided into three partitions, the
Sutta Vibhaṅga, the
Khadhakas, and the Parivāra. The concise account of each of
the partitions is below. 1. Sutta Vibhaṅga: The word Sutta (sūtra in Sanskrit) is a very ancient literary term in India. The literal meaning is "thread", and it is applied to a kind of book, the contents of which are, as it were, a thread, giving the gist or substance of more than is expressed in them in words. This sort of book was the latest development in Vedic literature just before and after the rise of Buddhism. The word was adopted by the Buddhists to mean a discourse, a chapter, a small portion of a sacred book in which for the most part some one point is raised, and more or less disposed of. But the Sutta par excellence, is that short statement of all the rules of the Order, which is also called the Pātimokkha, and is recited on every Uposatha day. The Sutta Vibhaṅga is a detailed analysis concerning the rules recorded in the Pātimokkha. It has the same eight sections as the Pātimokkha. Regarding each of the rules, the Sutta Vibhaṅga has a four-fold structures as already mentioned: 1. A story (or stories) explaining the circumstances under which the rule was pronounced; 2. The Pātimokkha rule; 3. A word for word commentary on the rules; and 4. Stories indicating mitigating circumstances in which exceptions to the rule or deviations in punishment might be made. Like the Pātimokkha there are both, a Bhikkhu Sutta Vibhaṅga (sometimes referred to as Mahā Vibhaṅga) and a Bhikkhuṇī Vibhaṅga.[66] 2. Khandhakas give the precepts for the various arrangements of the order and the regulation of the entire conduct of the monks and nuns in their daily life, form a kind of continuation and supplement of the Sutta Vibhaṅga. The ten sections of the Mahā Vagga contain the special precepts for admission into the order, for the Uposatha celebrations, for life during the rainy season, and further, the rules for the wearing of shoes, facilities for seats and vehicles, medicine and clothing of the monks, and finally for the regulation of the legal conditions and the legal procedure within the order, especially in the case of schisms. The first 9 sections of the Culla Vagga deal with the disciplinary methods in lesser matters, with various atonements and penances, the settlement of disputes, the daily life of the monks, dwellings and furnishing of dwellings, the duties of monk towards one another and the exclusion from the Pātimokkha ceremony. Section 10 of the Culla Vagga deals with the duties of the nuns. Sections 11 and 12 that record the stories of the first 2 councils are no doubt later additions, and form a kind of appendix to the Culla Vagga.[67] 3. Parivāra is regarded as insignificant and much later product. It is said with little doubt to be merely the work of a Sinhalese monk. The last book of the Vinaya Piṭaka comprises of 19 small texts, catechisms, Indices, appendices, lists and similar things. They have the form of questions and answers in common with the texts of Abhidhamma Piṭaka that originated perhaps at about the same time.[68] The Vinaya Piṭaka
is extant in the following versions: the Vinaya of the (1)
Theravādins in Pāli, portions of the Vinaya of the (2)
Mūlasarvāstivādins in Sanskrit contained in the Gilgit
Manuscripts; and in Tibetan and Chinese translations (in the latter,
not in its entirety); the Vinayas of the schools of (3)
Sarvāstivādins, (4) Dharmaguptas, (5) Mahiśāsakas,
and the (6) Mahāsaṅghikas
in Chinese translation. Besides, fragments are available in Sanskrit
that clearly belonged to or were associated with the originals of some
of these Vinayas. In its Chinese translation[69],
the Sarvāstivādin Vinaya is followed by the Vinayakṣudraka
and the Uttaragrantha, which includes an Upāliparipṛccha,
a series of questions on Vinaya put to the Buddha by Upāli.
This would seem to correspond to the Pāli Upāli-pañcaka, but a
Sanskrit portion of this found in Turkestan does not agree with
the Pāli Parivāra.
One Chinese version of the Upāliparipṛcchā
is said to be very similar to the Pāli Parivāra, although there
seem to be abridgements and changes of order in the treatment of the
various rules, and there is doubt about the sect to which this text
belonged. There also exists in Chinese an Ekottara section in
the appendices to the shortened version of the Sarvāstivādin
Vinaya called Daśādhyāya Vinaya. The
Dharmaguptaka Vinaya also has a section called Ekottara,
while the Mūlasarvāstivādins too had a supplement to their
Vinaya called Uttara-grantha. The fact that other schools
found it necessary to have supplements to their Vinayas
supports the view that some, at least, of the Pāli Parivāra was
composed in India before the introduction of Buddhism to Ceylon[70]. As to the relationship of these Vinayas,
it is now an established fact that the Prātimokṣa
is practically the same for all the sects, but the agreement is
supposed to extend to the Vibhaṅga
and even the Khandaka. Fragments have been discovered at
Koutcha which correspond to portions of the Mahāvagga; and
there is close resemblance that exists in the order of representation
between the Pāli and Mahāsaṅghika
Vinayas where the Mahāvagga is concerned. It appeared
that the diversity of the Vinaya redactions is a later growth
based on an originally common stock of rules[71]. While there is no direct evidence to suggest that
any of these recensions of the Vinaya text were fixed in
writing before the first century B.C., their uncanny similarity
suggests at once a common origin in a period of time preceding the
emergence of Buddhist sectarianism and a fundamental unwillingness on
behalf of Saṅgha communities to alter the basic charter of monastic
Buddhism[72]. In the scheme of stratification which B. C. Law
put for the whole Tipiṭaka,
the Vinaya Piṭaka
scatters into the 5 strata: (1) the Sīlas and the
Sikkhāpadas in the third stratum, (2) the earlier Pātimokkha
code of 152 rules in the fourth stratum, (3) the Sutta Vibhaṅga in the fifth stratum, (4) the Mahāvagga and the
Cullavagga, the Pātimokkha code completing 227 rules in the
sixth stratum, and (5) the Parivāra or Parivārapāṭha
in the ninth stratum[73].
In another way of observation, Oldenberg has sketched out the probable
course of five stages along which the growth of the Vinaya
proceeded: The Pātimokkha and part at least of the liturgical
formulae imbedded in the Khandakas form the earliest stage. The
old commentary, wholly philological and exegetical, and containing
nothing of a legendary or quasi-historical nature, constitutes the
next stage. The traditions of this latter character, together with
what we may call notes on the rules, were amalgamated to the text and
the old commentary which should be in the third stage. The last two
books of the Cullavagga are still later, and the Parivāra
is the latest of all. Thus, from the first rivulet of small and
definite nucleus, the Vinaya has reached its present form in at
least five stages[74]. In comparison between the scheme of B. C. Law and
that of T. W. Davids, the later is more general one in which the major
parts of the Vinaya Piṭaka,
namely, the Sutta Vibhaṅga
and the Khandaka, fall into the sixth stratum. The Sīla
and the Pātimokkha into the third stratum; and, no mention of
the Parivāra is available in his table[75]. 3. Chronology of the
Abhidhamma[76]
Piṭaka The Abhidhamma Piṭaka
known as the Basket of Special Doctrine or Further Doctrine, is the
third and historically the latest of the three Baskets. Unlike the
Sutta and Vinaya, the seven Abhidhamma works are not
generally claimed to represent the words of the Buddha himself but of
disciples and great scholars. Nevertheless, they are highly venerated,
particularly in Burma. These are not systematic philosophical
treatises but a detailed scholastic reworking, according to schematic
classifications, of doctrinal material appearing in the Suttas.
As such they represent a development in a rationalistic direction of
summaries or numerical lists that had come to be used as a basis for
meditation among the more mystically inclined, contributed to the
Prajñāpāramitā literature of Mahāyāna Buddhism, the form
predominant in East Asia. The topics dealt with in the Abhidhamma
books include ethics, psychology, and epistemology. As the last major division of the canon, the
Abhidhamma corpus has had a checkered history. It was not accepted
as canonical by the Mahāsaṅghika
school, the forerunners of Mahāyāna. Another school included within
the Abhidhamma division most of the Khuddaka Nikāya, the
latest section of the Sutta Piṭaka.
And various Mahāyāna texts have been classified as
Abhidhamma, including the Prajñāpāramitā-sutras in Tibet
and, in China, the Diamond Sūtra. G. C. Pande observes that the Abhidhamma
and its versions probably grew out of the Mātikās and is found
in only two schools - Theravāda and Sarvāstivāda. The
Dharmaguptas and the Kāśyapīyas are also supposed to have
had an Abhidharma Piṭaka
but they were sub-sects of the Sarvāstivāda group. The
Theravāda's Abhidhamma consists of seven works: Dhammasaṅgaṇi,
Vibhaṅga,
Dhātukatthā, Puggalapaññatti, Kathāvatthu, Yamaka,
Paṭṭhāna. The
Sarvāstivāda Abhidharma also consists of seven works:
Jñānaprasthāna and the six Pādaśāstras which are: (1)
Saṅgītiparyāyapāda, (2)
Dharmaskandha, (3) Prajñaptipāda, (4) Vijñānakāyapāda,
(5) Dhātukāyapāda, and (6) Prakaraṇapāda[77].
An examination of the titles of these texts, however, shows that only
one, viz. the Dhātukāya resembles any of the Theravādin
texts, and we must either assume that the number seven in each
collection is a coincidence, or deduce that the Sarvāstivādins
were aware of the number of texts in the Theravādin Abhidhamma Piṭaka
and deliberately refuted their texts and replaced them by new ones
after the schism[78].
The seven works of the Abhidhamma Piṭaka,
although based on the contents of the Buddha's discourses, deal with
selected and specific topics which form the basis for the later
philosophical interpretations. The following is a brief account on
each and every of the seven Abhidhamma works in the Pāli
version:
1. Dhammasaṅgaṇi (Summary of Dhamma): An enumeration of the
entities constituting reality. In practice, it is a psychologically
oriented manual of ethics for advanced monks but long popular in
Ceylon. 2. Vibhaṅga
(Division or Classification): A definition of these entities from
various points of view, a kind of supplement to the Dhammasaṅgaṇi, treating many
of the same topics. 3. Dhātukathā (Discussion of
Elements): A classification of the elements of reality according to
various levels of organization, another supplementary work. 4. Puggalapaññatti (Designation of
Person): An interesting psychological typology in which people are
classified according to their intellectual acumen and spiritual
attainments, largely a collection of excerpts from the Aṅguttara
Nikāya of the Sutta Piṭaka,
classifying human characteristics in relation to stages on the
Buddhist path; generally considered the earliest Abhidhamma
text. 5. Kathāvatthu (Points of
Controversy): A later work discussing the controversial doctrinal
points among the various ancient schools, attributed to
Moggaliputta, president of the third Buddhist Council, the only
work in the Pāli canon assigned to a particular author;
historically the most important of the seven, the Kathāvatthu
is a series of questions from a heretical (i.e. non-Theravāda)
point of view, with their implications refuted in the answers; the
long first chapter debates the existence of a soul. 6. Yamaka (Pairs): Dealing with
basic sets of categories arranged in pairs of questions, a series of
question on psychological phenomena, each dealt with in two opposite
ways. 7. Paṭṭhāna
(Activations or Causes):
A complex and voluminous treatment of causality and 23 other kinds of
relationships between phenomena, mental or material. About the chronology of the Abhidhamma in
all, K. R. Norman observes that the Abhidhamma is later than the rest
of the canon. There is no mention in the chronicles of reciting the
Abhidhamma at the first or second councils, although the Mahāvaṃsa states that the arahants who held the second
council knew the Tipiṭaka.
The Mahāsaṅghikas who
split from the Theravādins after the second council are said to
have refuted the Abhidhamma. This presumably means that there
was nothing corresponding exactly to the Pāli Abhidhamma in
their canon; from which it may be deduced that the Abhidhamma
did not exist at that time, or at least was not recognized as
canonical[79]. Tradition attributes these books to the Buddha
himself. But it is established in EBC that, as a matter of
fact, they must have been produced during a period of two or three
hundred years, beginning from the second or third century after the
Buddha's death. The books may be considered in three groups according
to their time of compilation: early, middle and late groups[80].
Now, we put them accordingly into the following chart: Table
5:
Buddhaghosa's conviction would encounter
the statement by B. C. Law that in dealing with the chronology of the
seven treatises, we can only maintain that the order in which these
treatises are enumerated can not be interpreted as the order of the
chronology. Any attempt at establishing such an interpretation would
be vitiated by the fact that the order of enumeration is not in all
cases the same. To give example B. C. Law notes that in Milinda
Pañha the order in which these books are mentioned is: Dhammasaṅgaṇi
(Dhammasaṁgaha as
Buddhaghosa calls it), Vibhaṅga,
Dhātukathā, Puggalapaññatti, Kathāvatthu,
Yamaka, and Paṭṭhāna.
So the order recorded in EBC of chronology is probably based on
the Milinda Pañha. B. C. Law hold that an inquiry into the
Suttanta background of the Abhidhammapiṭaka
becomes a desideratum and we may lay down a general chronology in
these terms: The closer the connection with the Sutta
materials, the earlier is the date of composition. On this basis and
in view of some dialectical features B. C. Law observes that that
Puggalapaññatti is the first book of the Abhidhamma Piṭaka.
And his own order for the seven treatises is as follows[82].
Table
6:
For the laying out of his account of the
Abhidhamma texts, K. R. Norman follows the order suggested by B.
C. Law where the Paṭṭhāna
is the last book. He, however, prefers the last position of the
Yamaka to that of Paṭṭhāna,
saying that such a text, which seems to be intended for someone who
has already studied the system, but wishes to become fully competent
in it, is perhaps the latest of the books in the Abhidhamma Piṭaka[84]. In B. C. Law's scheme of stratification for the
whole Tipiṭaka, the
Abhidhamma texts scatter into the three strata: (1) the
Puggalapaññatti and the Vibhaṅga
in the fifth stratum, (2) the Kathāvatthu in the sixth stratum,
and (3) the Dhātukathā, the Yamaka, and the Paṭṭhāna
in the seventh stratum. Unfortunately, the Dhammasaṅgaṇi
is not mentioned in B. C. Law's tabulation[85].
Whereas T. W. Davids is much more vgeneral to put all of them into the
tenth and last stratum of his scheme with the note that the last of
which is the Kathāvatthu and the earliest probably the
Puggalapaññatti[86]. On being aware of the position of the Sutta Piṭaka as the most substantial importance among the remaining of the Buddhist canonical literature we shall reserve the next whole chapter for an account of its in a chronological prospective.
[1]
NSOED: 1778-1779.
[2]
J. Dhirasekera, EBC. 4: 169.
[3]
S. v: 263; D. 3: 223; A. iv: 86.
[4]
S. i: 194.
[5]
Ibid. iv: 195.
[6]
M. i: 120, 242.
[7]
S. i: 75.
[8]
J. Dhirasekera, EBC. 4: 169.
[9]
see more in the next section.
[10]
vijānātī kho bhikkhave tasmā viññāṇaṃ ti vuccati: S. iii: 87.
[11]
T. W. Rhys Davids & William Stede, PED: 266.
[12]
J. Dhirasekera, EBC. 4: 169.
[13]
Ibid. 4: 169.
[14]
Dhp. v. 1-2.
[15]
see Buddhaghosa, Vism: 21-22, 452-454; and Exp: 84-85.
[16]
Saññā ca vedanā ca cetasikā ete dhammā cittapa ibaddhā:
S. iv: 293.
[17]
J. Dhirasekera, EBC. 4: 170.
[18]
Dhp. v. 37.
[19]
He is said to be the author of Sphuṭārthā
Abhidharmakośa Vyākhyā. see
M. Winternitz, HIL: 344.
[20]
J. Dhirasekera, EBC. 4: 171.
[21]
Ibid. 4: 169.
[22]
D. i: 202.
[23]
S. iv: 309.
[24]
Abhabbo kho Sunakkhatta acelo Pāṭika-putto
taṃ vācaṃ
appahāya taṃ cittaṃ
appahāya taṃ diṭṭhiṃ
appaṭinissajjitvā mama
sammukhī - bhāvaṃ āgantuṃ.
Sace pi'ssa evam assa - Ahaṃ
taṃ vācaṃ
appahāya taṃ cittaṃ
appahāya taṃ diṭṭhim
appatinissajjitva Samaṇassa
Gotamassa sammukhī - bhāvaṃ
gaccheyyanti, - mudhā pitassa vipateyyāti. For the translation see
DB. iii: 18.
[25]
J. Dhirasekera, EBC. 4: 170.
[26]
J. Atkinson, E. Berne and R. S. Woodworth, DP: 187-8.
[27]
J. Dhirasekera, Op. Cit. 4: 174.
[28]
Dhs.: 1-5.
[29]
J. Dhirasekera, Op. Cit. 4: 170.
[30]
sududdasa, sunipuna: Dhp. v. 36.
[31]
dunniggaha, lahu, yatthakāma nipāti : Dhp. v. 35.
[32]
Nicca utrastam idaṃ cittaṃ,
niccam ubbiggam idaṃ mano:
S. i: 53.
[33]
Anekapari-yāyena h'āvuso Sāti paṭiccayā
natthi viññāṇassa sambhavo:
M. i: 256-7.
[34]
A. i: 10.
[35]
Dhp. v. 33.
[36]
Ibid. v. 34.
[37]
N. Ross Reat, OIP: 99.
[38]
Ibid.: 101.
[39]
Ibid.: 107.
[40]
Ibid.: 254.
[41]
C. A. F. Rhys Davids, BIPDB: 8.
[42]
Ibid.: 21.
[43]
Ibid.: 68-69.
[44]
N. Ross Reat, OIP: 104.
[45]
ciketati... sumnena cetasā: Ibid.: 102 sq.
[46]
Ibid.: 252.
[47]
Ibid.: 103.
[48]
Ibid.: 101-102.
[49]
C. A. F. Rhys Davids, BIPDB: 71.
[50]
N. Ross Reat, op. cit.: 252.
[51]
David J. Kalupahana, PBP: 12.
[52]
N. Ross Reat, OIP: 253.
[53]
Ibid.: 106.
[54]
Ibid.: 253-254.
[55]
B. C. Law, HPL: 1.
[56]
Ibid.: 13.
[57]
G. P. Malalasekera, DPN, vol. 2: 163.
[58]
B. C. Law, HPL: 13-14.
[59]
K. T. S. Sarao, ONAIB: 33.
[60]
K. L. Hazra, PLL: 132.
[61]
M. Winternitz: HIL: 33.
[62]
K. L. Hazra, PLL: 131.
[63]
Ibid.: 131-132.
[64]
Ibid.: 135.
[65]
K. R. Norman, PL: 18.
[66]
S. R. Goyal, HIB: 162.
[67]
M. Winternitz, HIL: 25-26.
[68]
Ibid.: 33.
[69]
G. C. Pande, SOB: 2.
[70]
K. R. Norman, PL: 28-29.
[71]
G. C. Pande, SOB: 3.
[72]
K. L. Hazra, PLL: 134.
[73]
B. C. Law, HPL: 42.
[74]
G. C. Pande, SOB: 17-18.
[75]
T. W. Rhys Davids, BI: 188.
[76]
see an account of the term in K. R. Norman, PL: 97-98.
[77]
G. C. Pande, SOB: 1-2.
[78]
K. R. Norman, PL: 107.
[79]
Ibid.: 96.
[80]
J. Dhirasekera, EBC. 1: 75b sq.
[81]
K. R. Norman, PL: 98.
[82]
B. C. Law, HPL: 21-22.
[83]
K. R. Norman, PL: 102.
[84]
Ibid.: 106.
[85]
B. C. Law, HPL: 42.
[86]
T. W. Rhys Davids, BI: 188. -ooOoo- Top of page | Contents | 0a | 0b | 01 | 02 | 03 | 04 | 05 | 06 | 07 | 08 | 09 | 10 |
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